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The Proposed New WIPO Treaty for 
Increased Protection for Audiovisual 
Performers:  Its Provisions and Its 
Domestic and International Implications 
Adler Bernard* 
INTRODUCTION 
Creative control over ones artistic endeavor is an important right 
that an artist strives to retain.  In addition to creative control, artists 
seek to prevent the unlawful distribution of the creative product, 
insist on being acknowledged as the creator of the work, and aim to 
achieve adequate compensation for the creation.  Through union 
organization, treaties and national legislation, countries have tried to 
ensure that these rights, and others, are protected for those men and 
women whose talents have enlightened, challenged, and entertained 
us for centuries. 
Utilitarian principles adopted in the U.S., and other common law 
countries, serve as a basis for affording copyright protection to 
writers, musicians and thespians under these legal regimes.  These 
individuals are granted financial remuneration in return for access to 
their products.  Through financial encouragement and statutory 
protection, artists and society as a whole benefit.  In the U.S., 
copyrighted material including books, phonographs and audiovisual 
works, and the administrative processes associated with the creative 
arts are great sources of wealth both domestically and internationally.  
Due to this union of creativity, economics and legislation, the U.S. 
remains the premier exporter of entertainment content throughout the 
world.1 
 
* The author is a former employee of Sony Music Publishing; J.D. expected 2002, George 
Washington University Law School; B.A., New York University, 1997.  The author would 
like to thank Professor Ralph Oman of George Washington University, Martino & Julie 
Bernard, Stan Bernard, Ralph Bernard, and Tara Scott. 
1See S. REP. NO. 104-315, at 9 (1998) (noting that the U.S. exports more copyrighted 
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Conversely, in countries such as France, Japan, and in regions such 
as Latin America and francophone Africa, an artists work product is 
viewed as an extension of his or her personality.  Ralph Oman, 
George Washington University Law School Professor and former 
U.S. Register of Copyrights, noted that [t]he authors right in his 
work is one of the basic Rights of Man the French embraced in their 
Revolution of 1789.2  Preservation of an artists Natural Rights, 
as opposed to his or her rights to economic compensation, is the 
primary reason why nations such as France seek to establish 
adequate means of protection for the moral or spiritual aspects of 
an artists work product. 
Technological developments have given rise to increased modes of 
distributing creative content, thus allowing purveyors of art to access 
creative works from almost anywhere in the world.  For example, 
one could view the latest installment at the Whitney Museum in New 
York City from the comfort of ones home in Accra, Ghana.  This 
increased exposure has expanded the artists potential audience and 
has created additional sources of revenue.  However, with 
technological innovation and increased exposure have come 
numerous logistical and legal problems for artists, utilitarian 
proponents and the natural rights regime legislators who scramble to 
keep the law in step with our rapidly changing society. 
Via the International Convention for the Protection of Performers, 
Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations 
(hereinafter ROME),3 the 1976 U.S. Copyright Act,4 the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
(hereinafter TRIPS),5 various E.U. Directives6 and most recently 
 
intellectual property than any other country in the world). 
 2 See Professor Ralph Oman, The Impact of the Berne Convention on U.S. Copyright 
1, 6, Address at the International Intellectual Property Association (Oct. 24, 1996). 
 3 See International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of 
Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations,  Oct. 26, 1961, 496 U.N.T.S. 43 [hereinafter 
ROME]. 
 4 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1995). 
 5 See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Dec. 15, 
1993, art. 9, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 81, 87 [hereinafter TRIPS]. 
 6 See MARJUT SALOKANNEL, OWNERSHIP OF RIGHTS IN AUDIOVISUAL PRODUCTIONS: A 
COMPARATIVE STUDY Art. 5(1) (1997). 
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the World Intellectual Property Organizations (hereinafter WIPO) 
Performances and Phonograms Treaty (hereinafter WPPT) adopted 
in 1996,7 domestic and international copyright negotiators have 
attempted to do just that. 
With the adoption of the WPPT, musicians, songwriters and audio 
performers witnessed the enactment of legislation that granted them 
enhanced protection and control over their contributions to sound 
recordings, plays, motion pictures and other works that use music.8  
Uniform standards concerning the definition of authorship, length of 
ownership and control over the distribution, licensing and 
duplication of copyrightable content were set forth in this treaty and 
adopted by the contracting nations.9 
However, one group of artists was conspicuously excluded from 
the scope of the WPPTs protection.  The WPPT failed to outline a 
method for harmonizing legislation that would ensure protection of 
the rights of audiovisual performers in their contributions to 
audiovisual fixations.10  Consensus could not be reached on the 
manner and scope of protection to be granted to actors.11  These 
differences led WIPO members to abandon their hopes of including 
audiovisual performers within the WPPT.12 
At the close of the 1996 diplomatic conference in Geneva, WIPO 
members passed a resolution that called for member states to 
reconvene at a later date to negotiate a treaty that would address 
audiovisual performers rights.13  In the months leading up to the 
review of a proposed treaty, U.S. and E.U. representatives were at 
odds over how the following issues should be addressed within the 
international accord: (1) national treatment; (2) the scope of 
 
 7 See World Intellectual Property Organization Performances and Phonograms Treaty, 
Dec. 20, 1996, S. Exec. Doc. 105-17, 18, 36 I.L.M. 76 [hereinafter WPPT]. 
 8 See id. 
 9 See id. 
 10 See ROME, supra note 3; see also Diplomatic Conference Set for December on 
Global Pact to Protect Audiovisual Rights, 59 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 
868 (2000). 
 11 See id. 
 12 See id. at 869. 
 13 See id. 
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protection that should be afforded to performers for the public 
broadcast of their works; (3) transfer of rights; and (4) moral rights.14 
After much debate, negotiators from over 120 nations met in 
December of 2000 at the Diplomatic Conference on the Protection of 
Audiovisual Performances.  Agreement was reached on nineteen of 
the twenty proposed Articles that comprise the treaty.  Consensus 
could not be reached on an appropriate manner with which 
audiovisual performers would transfer their rights to producers so as 
to allow producers greater ease in administering and licensing rights 
to the audiovisual production.15 
This article will examine sixteen of the twenty articles within the 
proposed treaty and what impact the treaty would have had on the 
manner in which the rights of audiovisual performers are currently 
addressed domestically and internationally.  First, the article will 
examine how audiovisual and phonogram performers are protected 
under the WPPT and TRIPS.  Next, brief attention shall be paid to 
the domestic copyright systems of France, Germany and the United 
States.  Finally, there will be an analysis of the treaty and a proposal 
put forward as to how the nations may want to resolve their 
differences concerning transfer of rights from audiovisual performers 
to producers. 
II. PROTECTION OF AUDIO AND AUDIOVISUAL PERFORMERS: 
HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
ROME provides minimum standards of protection to musicians, 
writers, actors and other creative individuals.16  ROME prohibits the 
fixation of a performers work without prior consent, and forbids the 
reproduction of works that diverge from that to which the performer 
had previously consented.17  ROME also prohibits the broadcasting 
 
 14 See id. 
 15 See Basic Proposal for the Substantive Provisions of an Instrument on the Protection 
of Audiovisual Performances to be Considered by the Diplomatic Conference, World 
Intellectual Prop. Org. Diplomatic Conference on the Prot. of Audiovisual Performances, at 
22, U.N. Doc. IAVP/DC/3 (Aug. 1, 2000) [hereinafter Proposal]. 
 16 See ROME, supra note 3. 
 17 See id. 
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and communication of a performers work without prior consent.18  
Furthermore, Article 4 of ROME calls for each contracting nation to 
grant national treatment to audio and audiovisual performers, and 
Article 14 calls for a minimum duration of twenty years of protection 
that shall be calculated from the end date of when fixation is first 
made.19 Lastly, similar to subsequent treaties and statutes covering 
copyrightable material, ROME grants individuals a fair use 
exception that is found in Article 15(1).20 
ROMEs basic protection covers fixations made by the recording 
of audio performances and the filming of audiovisual works.  ROME 
fails to address issues concerning moral rights, transfer of rights and 
the protection of a performers contributions to a sound recording.  
The importance of each of these unresolved issues grew in the 
decades following the enactment of ROME in 1961 due in part to 
technological advancement, increased lobbying power of performers 
in their respective countries, and shifts in opinions on how the 
contracting nations viewed their cultural products.  The WPPT and 
the Proposed Audiovisual Performances Treaty both set out to go 
beyond the basic protocols outlined in ROME. 
Under the WPPT, 127 member nations sought to broaden 
performers rights by: (1) including performers of folklore within the 
scope of the treaty; (2) granting audio performers rights with respect 
to the communication of their work via the broadcasting of their 
recordings; (3) establishing moral rights for performers; and (4) 
calling for a fifty-year minimum term of protection.21  The WPPT 
proved to be a boon to audio performers because in addition to the 
rights above, audio performers were also granted inalienable moral 
rights that provided them with the right of attribution in their aural 
performances fixed in phonograms.22 
The WPPT also addressed emerging formats of distribution of 
phonograms, particularly those performances transmitted via the 
 
 18 See id. 
 19 See id. 
 20 See id. 
 21 See WPPT, supra note 7, at 34. 
 22 See id. at 26. 
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Internet.  Included in the audio performers exclusive right to 
authorize any communication to the public that incorporates fixed 
elements of their work, audio performers were afforded the right to 
control the distribution of their works through any form including 
on-line/on-demand services.23  Furthermore, the treaty called for the 
ratifying nations to adopt a general right of distribution and a rental 
right limited to computer programs, movies and works embodied in 
phonograms.24  Provisions on rights management information and 
enforcement procedures that guard against tampering with 
technological measures designed  to impede any attempted infringing 
reproduction, also found their way into the WPPT.25 
The WPPT could have easily been seen as a great step towards 
harmonizing protection for audio performers and granting these 
artists increased economic rights in their performances.  However, 
many of the 762 representatives of the 127 nations who attended the 
Geneva Conference would object to such a conclusion.  Similar to 
ROME, the WPPT failed to explicitly address the rights of 
audiovisual performers in their audiovisual fixations.  Many were 
disappointed by this omission.26  Richard Arnold, author of 
Performers Rights, a comparative study of European and U.S. audio 
performers copyright protection, wrote that [t]his [omission] was at 
the insistence of the U.S.27  One could only assume that U.S. trade 
representatives were somewhat influenced by the political clout 
possessed by Hollywood producers who have long opposed setting 
universal standards for the protection of audiovisual performers other 
than those provided via labor law, the Screen Actors Guild 
(hereinafter SAG) representation, and individual personal service 
contracts.28 
While performance rights under TRIPS are not as exhaustive as 
those mandated by the  WPPT, they do require some discussion.  
Like the WPPT, TRIPS fails to address the rights of audiovisual 
 
 23 See id. 
 24 See id. 
 25 See id. at 35. 
 26 See RICHARD ARNOLD, PERFORMERS RIGHTS § 1.94, at 35 (2d ed. 1997). 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. 
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performers within its scope of protection.  TRIPS does grant 
phonogram performers certain rights including national treatment, 
most favored nations status, and detailed rules concerning minimum 
standards of protection for phonogram performances.  The agreement 
incorporates minimum standards outlined in Articles 1 through 21 of 
the Paris Act relating to the Berne Convention for the Protection of 
Literary and Artistic Works (hereinafter Berne), but excludes 
Article 6biss requirement of moral rights.29  Marshall Leaffer, author 
of Understanding Copyright Law, wrote that this omission was due 
in large part to the U.S. insistence that it be left out of TRIPS.30  The 
U.S. argued persuasively that the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (hereinafter GATT)/TRIPS intended to regulate economic 
rights, and since moral rights are not economic rights, they had no 
place in the negotiation. 
Similar to the WPPT, TRIPS grants audio performers the right to 
prevent any fixation of their unfixed performances, and 
reproductions of their performances without prior consent.31  Also, 
audio performers may block broadcasts made by wireless means and 
other communications to the public that occur without their prior 
consent.32 One other important aspect of TRIPS with respect to 
copyright law is that it requires participating nations to provide both 
civil and administrative procedures and remedies that copyright 
owners can use to enforce their rights.33 
Unlike the WPPT, the omission of audiovisual performers 
protection in TRIPS was not solely the United States doing.  
Thomas Murray, author of The U.S.  French Dispute over GATT 
Treatment of Audiovisual Products and the Limits of Public Choice 
Theory: How an Efficient Market Solution was Rent-Seeking, 
writes that, France and the other European Community nations 
wanted the audiovisual sector to be excluded from the services 
section (General Agreement on Trade in Services) of the General 
 
 29 See TRIPS, supra note 5. 
 30 See MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW § 12.11, at 398 (3d ed. 
1999). 
 31 See TRIPS, supra note 5. 
 32 See id. 
 33 See id. 
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Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) talks; the U.S. wanted the 
sector included.34  The American entertainment industry, which 
lobbied heavily for inclusion, was seen as the big loser.35  The 
debate centered around a proposal put forward by France and other 
European nations that would have placed a quota on the number of 
audiovisual products that they would allow to be imported into their 
territories, particularly products emanating from the U.S.36 
Jack Valenti, president of the Motion Pictures Association of 
America (hereinafter MPAA), lobbied on behalf of the U.S. film 
industry in opposing any such restriction.37  Mr. Valenti did not have 
a difficult time convincing the Clinton Administration that such a 
quota would greatly impair not only the film industry, but also would 
adversely affect the U.S. economy.  Murray noted the following: 
The American Entertainment industry is the second largest export 
industry in the U.S. after the aerospace and aviation sector, 
generating foreign revenues of approximately $18 billion annually 
and producing a trade surplus of $4 billion in 1992 alone.  
Furthermore, 414,700 workers were directly employed in the 
filmindustry and, for every two direct jobs, three were created in 
support industries.38 
French representatives strictly opposed free audiovisual trade and 
pushed for an audiovisual performances protection initiative to be 
handled separately from industrial service products.  The justification 
asserted was their desire to foster and protect local European customs 
and moral values.39  Quotas entitled The Television Without 
Frontiers Directive imposed restrictions on E.U. members that 
would require broadcasters to air certain minimum percentages of 
audiovisual productions of European origin.40 The U.S. also took 
 
 34 Thomas Murray, The U.S.  French Dispute over GATT Treatment of Audiovisual 
Products and the Limits of Public Choice Theory: How an Efficient Market Solution was 
Rent-Seeking, 21 MD. J. INTL L. & TRADE 205 (1997). 
 35 Id. 
 36 See generally id. at 205, 207. 
 37 See generally id. 
 38 Id. at 207. 
 39 Murray, supra note 34, at 207-08. 
 40 See Council Directive 89/552 on the Coordination of Certain Provisions Laid Down 
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exception to the Europeans insistence on continuing subsidies to 
member states film industries.41 
Like the United States position during the GATT and WPPT 
talks, French trade representatives were greatly influenced by their 
film industry lobbyists.  Arguments for the preservation of a distinct 
European identity within European broadcast content may have been 
sincere, but this was only part of the story.  German director Wim 
Wenders and a host of other European producers, writers, directors 
and audiovisual performers were greatly involved in ensuring that 
cultural goods were left out of the GATT/TRIPS agreement.42 
Political pressures and selfish cultural and economic concerns all 
contributed to the exclusion of provisions that would have 
guaranteed audiovisual performers minimum standards of 
international protection that were already afforded to audio 
performers.  However, E.U. members have taken affirmative steps 
towards harmonizing the laws governing audiovisual performers 
with those that already safeguard the rights of audio performers.  The 
first step was to reach a consensus on who is deemed to be the 
author of an audiovisual performance.  Member states adopted E.U. 
Directive 92/100/EEC, which states that the principal director of a 
cinematographic or audiovisual work shall be [considered] its 
author.43 
This same E.U. Directive also endeavors to protect the rights of 
audio and audiovisual performers by calling any illegal fixation of a 
performers live performances an act of piracy.44  The directive 
enacts provisions outlining the exclusive licensing and economic 
rights of audiovisual performers similar to those adopted in the 
WPPT.  Audiovisual performers have the exclusive right to 
distribute, authorize or prohibit the broadcasting of their 
performances made via wireless means, and other communications to 
 
by Law, Regulation or Administration in Member States Concerning the Pursuit of 
Television Activities, 1989 O.J. (L 298) 23, cited in Murray, supra note 34, at 208. 
 41 See id. 
 42 See id. 
 43 SALOKANNEL, supra note 6, at Art. 5(1). 
 44 See id. at Art. 5(2)(1). 
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the public.45  Lastly, audiovisual performers have the right to 
authorize or prohibit the rental and lending of the fixations of their 
performances.46 
In an effort to allow for an easier means of administering all of the 
various rights of  the contributors to an audiovisual production, the 
French system, like most other domestic copyright systems, sets 
forth a method by which all rights are transferred from audiovisual 
performers and writers to the producer or director of the work.  
French law explicitly states:  Contracts binding the producer and the 
authors of an audiovisual work, other than the author of a musical 
composition with or without words, shall imply, unless otherwise 
stipulated . . . assignment to the producer of the exclusive 
exploitation rights in the audiovisual work.47 
With respect to audiovisual performers, French law clearly states 
that the signing of a contract between the performer and a producer 
for the making of an audiovisual work shall imply the authorization 
to fix, reproduce, and communicate to the public the performance of 
the performer.48  Although the contract between an artist and the 
producer is viewed primarily as an employment contract, it has been 
given certain legal effect under the countrys artist rights law.49  
Marjut Salokannel wrote that [a]s a counterpart to the automatic 
assignment of rights to the producer, the law provides that such 
contract shall specify a separate remuneration for each mode of 
exploitation of the work.50 
Similar to French law, the German system establishes that the 
producer of an audiovisual work holds the right to control the 
distribution and fixation of the audiovisual production.51  With the 
adoption of the E.U. Directive 92/100/EEC, performers were at least 
in theory granted the exclusive right to prohibit the reproduction and 
distribution of their audiovisual fixations to the public under German 
 
 45 See id. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. at Art. 8(1)(2)(1). 
 48 SALOKANNEL, supra note 6, at Art. (8)(1)(2)(2). 
 49 See id. 
 50 Id. 
 51 See id. at Art. 8(1)(1)(1). 
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law.52  However, to balance this new directive with the existing 
rights granted to producers, audiovisual performers are deemed to 
have assigned their rights once they finalize an agreement with the 
producer with regard to their participation in the audiovisual 
production.53 Furthermore, unlike the French system, performers 
rights in an audiovisual production are usually collectively assigned 
to the producer via collective labor agreements.54  Employment law 
and artists rights law governs the relationship between the two 
parties. 
The granting of moral rights protection to audio and audiovisual 
performers has been hotly contested in France, Germany and 
throughout most of the European Union.  Most European countries 
view protecting an artists moral rights as a worthwhile endeavor.  At 
the same time, these nations understand the importance of taking into 
account the nature and scale of an audiovisual production with 
respect to moral rights.55  Just imagine a scenario in which a 
performer could dictate which scenes could be used in the final 
version of a film or the placement of their name in the end credits.  
Such authority granted to each major artist in an audiovisual 
production could greatly delay, if not derail, the completion of the 
project.  Due to this concern, European countries have placed great 
restrictions on performers ability to exercise their rights of integrity 
and attribution.  In France, performers are prohibited from exercising 
their moral rights during the production of a work, and it is only 
after the final version of the film has been approved by a common 
accord between the director and producer that moral rights protection 
may come into play.56  At that point in the production, due to the 
transfer  of rights  from the performers to the producer or director via  
 
 52 See id. 
 53 See SALOKANNEL, supra note 6, at Art. 8(1)(1)(2). 
 54 See id. 
 55 See id. at Art. 2(2)(1). 
 56 See id. at Art. 9(2)(1). 
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the signing of a contract, only the director or producer may exercise 
their moral rights, not the performer.57 
Unlike European copyright systems, the American copyright 
regime views an audiovisual performers contribution to an 
audiovisual production as a work made for hire.58  According to § 
101 of the 1976 Copyright Act, the employer, or the one who 
commissioned the work, is deemed to be the author.59  The executive 
producer is more than likely the employer under the U.S. system.  
The relationship between audiovisual performers and producers is 
governed under labor and employment law.60  Guilds such as SAG 
represent performers and negotiate performers economic rights and 
general employment terms with respect to their participation in any 
audiovisual performance.61  Thanks in part to this relationship, 
audiovisual performers have managed to reap excellent financial 
benefits, albeit sacrificing some protection under copyright law. 
Unlike European performers, U.S. audiovisual performers have not 
technically been afforded moral rights.  Writers, directors and audio 
performers also lack a strict statutory regime of moral rights 
protection as outlined under Berne.  Several states have passed 
statutes that recognize a visual artists rights of integrity and 
paternity in limited circumstances.62  Under the federal scheme, 
visual artists are granted the rights of integrity and attribution under 
the Visual Artists Rights Act (hereinafter VARA).63  But this 
limited protection does not cover the works of writers, directors or 
audiovisual and audio performers.  Many in the U.S., including the 
Executive Director of the Writers Guild East, view the lack of moral 
rights protection within the audiovisual context as being 
problematic.64 
 
 
 57 See id. 
 58 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1995). 
 59 See id. 
 60 See SALOKANNEL, supra note 6, at 334. 
 61 See id., § 10.2 at 305. 
 62 See LEAFFER, supra note 30, § 8.28(B), at 362. 
 63 See 17 U.S.C. § 106A (1996). 
 64 See SALOKANNEL, supra note 6, § 10.2.2, at 307. 
FRMT4BERNARD 5/17/02  3:10 PM 
2002] WIPOS PROPOSED AUDIOVISUAL PROTECTIONS 1101 
 
III.  WIPO TREATY FOR THE PROTECTION OF AUDIOVISUAL 
PERFORMANCES 
Consensus was reached on all but one of the twenty Articles put 
forth in the proposed WIPO Treaty.65  The 120 nations reached 
provisional agreement on legislation that would harmonize 
international treatment of audiovisual performers rights with respect 
to distribution, reproduction, national treatment, the audiovisual 
performers economic rights to unfixed performances and other 
entitlements granted to performers in their audiovisual fixations.66 
Articles 1 and 2 cover the preamble and provide definitions of key 
terms used in the treaty.67  One important provision in Article 2 deals 
with the definition of performer that was agreed upon by the 
contracting nations.68  Before the proposed treaty was presented to 
the respective nations, representatives on behalf of the U.S. film 
industries had opposed ratifying such a treaty due to the effect it 
would have on the administration of rights in audiovisual 
productions.69  Donald Wear of Discovery Communications, who 
represented North American Broadcasters at the Convention, noted 
that as a result of the proposed treaty broadcasters would be subject 
to significantly higher administrative burden[s].70 
In acknowledgment of such a fear, negotiators agreed that the 
definition of performers would be limited to marquee audiovisual 
performers.71 Extras or ancillary audiovisual performers would not 
be afforded protection under the proposed treaty.  In the eyes of the 
contracting states, ancillary participants do not qualify for 
protection because they do not, in proper sense, perform literary or 
 
 65 See USPTO TODAY, November-December 2001, at http://www.uspto.gov 
/web/offices/ac/ ahrpa/opa/ptotoday /nov-dec2001.pdf (last visited Feb. 8, 2002). 
 66 See Proposal, supra note 15. 
 67 See id. 
 68 See id. at 22. 
 69 WIPO to Debate Rights, TELEVISION DIGEST, Sept. 25, 2000, at 
http://www.findArticles.com/cf_0/m3169/39_40/65465363/print.jhtml (last visited Jan. 6, 
2002). 
 70 See id. 
 71 See Proposal, supra note 15, Art. 2., at 22. 
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artistic work.72  The treaty does grant each contracting nation the 
right to draft domestic legislation that would give the extras some 
protection under domestic audiovisual performances law.73  The 
International Federation of Actors (hereinafter FIA), an 
international lobbying society for audiovisual performers, is in 
agreement with this resolution.74  The definition of a performer in the 
proposed treaty is similar to that adopted in the WPPT with two 
minor additions: (1) interpretive arts is added to the list of 
protected performances, and (2) an audiovisual performer who 
engages in the expression of folklore is covered within the scope of 
the treaty.75 
Article 3 provides a clear statement of who would be protected 
under the proposed treaty.  An audiovisual performer must be a 
national of one of the contracting nations to be afforded protection.76  
If an audiovisual performer is a national of a contracting nation, the 
performer will be protected even if he or she is habitually residing in 
a non-contracting nation.  This language mirrors that which is found 
in Article 3(2) of Berne.77 
Article 5 deals with the hotly contested debate over the protection 
of moral rights.78  The WPPT was the first international instrument to 
grant moral rights to performers.  Not all contracting nations 
incorporated such protection into their domestic laws.  In particular, 
as mentioned above, the U.S. became a party to both the Berne 
Convention in 1989 and the WPPT without explicitly adopting any 
federal law extending moral rights to all areas of creativity.  The U.S. 
did pass VARA, which grants visual artists the rights of attribution  
 
 72 Id. 
 73 See id. 
 74 See INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF ACTORS, Comments on the WIPO Basic 
Proposal: Prepared for the Diplomatic Conference, December 2000, at 4, at http://www.fia-
actors.com/new/wipo_2000_comments_eng.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2002). 
 75 See Proposal, supra note 15, Art. 2., at 22 (Aug. 1, 2000). 
 76 See id. at 28. 
 77 See Paris Act relating to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and 
Artistic Works, Jul. 24, 1971, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Berne]. 
 78 See Proposal, supra note 15, at 32. 
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and integrity in their works, but audio and audiovisual performers are 
not covered within its scope.79 
Under Article 5 of the proposed instrument, audiovisual 
performers are granted the right to be identified as a performer in an 
audiovisual production.80  This clause mirrors that which was 
adopted in Article 5 of the WPPT.81  An exception was added to the 
treaty that would prohibit audiovisual performers from exercising 
their moral rights when, omission is dictated by the manner of the 
use of the performance.82  This exception is important for it allows 
producers to omit a performers identity in an effort to preserve the 
integrity of a work, and it grants contracting nations some flexibility 
in incorporating Article 5 into their domestic law. 
Article 5 also states that audiovisual performers would have the 
authority to oppose any material distortion of their performances 
fixed in an audiovisual medium that would be prejudicial to their 
reputation.83  In an effort to decrease the number of possible causes 
of action available to a performer under moral rights legislation, 
alterations or modifications to a production including standard 
editing and abridgment, would not qualify as material distortion.84  In 
order for the performer to establish a claim under this clause, an 
individual assessment of the way the distortion or change was made 
would be necessary.85  Similar to moral rights regulations in France 
and Germany, such an assessment would be conducted using a 
subjective standard, with close attention paid to the rights of 
additional right holders in the production.86  The notes to the 
proposed Article clarify this point in stating that any alteration would 
not be prejudicial unless it was meaningful or substantial.87 
 
 79 See 17 U.S.C. § 106A (1996). 
 80 See Proposal, supra note 15, at 32. 
 81 See WPPT, supra note 7, Art. 5, S. Exec. Doc. 105-17, 18, 36 I.L.M. at 82. 
 82 Proposal, supra note 15, at 32. 
 83 See id. 
 84 See id. at 34. 
 85 See id. 
 86 See id. 
 87 See Proposal, supra note 15, at 36. 
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Finally, Article 5 of the proposed treaty puts forth a means by 
which an audiovisual performer could waive the moral rights either 
by contract or collective labor agreement.88  A performer could agree 
to waive the rights to be identified as the performer or to object to 
any substantial change to fixations of their audiovisual performances 
through an agreement between the parties explicitly waiving moral 
rights protection.  Such a gesture on the part of the performer would 
more than likely be granted in return for financial remuneration. 
Moral rights protection is a thorny issue for the FIA.  The FIA 
wishes to include language from Article 6(1) of Berne that would 
cover any derogatory action, even that which is not explicitly listed 
in the treaty or currently documented in any national law, in relation 
to the performance. 89  The FIA views the granting of moral rights 
protection to audiovisual performers as important because [i]t 
would seem a serious shortcoming if the proposed Instrument did not 
give a featured actor starring in a cinema film recourse against a 
producer who decided to insert a number of pornographic scenes in 
the released motion picture attempting to boost box office appeal.90 
Agreement on the scope of Article 5 was difficult for the 
negotiators to reach.  United States and E.U. representatives 
unequivocally disagreed with each other.  The U.S. pushed for a 
narrow reading of moral rights law that would permit the making of 
minor changes to an audiovisual work without requiring approval 
from the audiovisual performer.91  Q. Todd Dickinson, the former 
Director of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, stated that certain 
modifications are part of the normal exploitation of the work, 
including modifications necessary in reducing the cinema-sized work 
to the television-sized work or editing the work to exclude scenes 
considered inappropriate for certain audiences.92  Conversely, E.U. 
 
 88 See id. at 36. 
 89 See INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF ACTORS, Comments on the WIPO Basic 
Proposal: Prepared for the Diplomatic Conference, December 2000, at 4, at http://www.fia-
actors.com/new/wipo_2000_comments_eng.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2002); see also Berne, 
supra note 77. 
 90 Id. 
 91 WIPO Members Fail to Agree on Performers Rights for Audiovisual Treaty, 61 PAT. 
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 231, 234 (2001). 
 92 Id. 
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negotiators lobbied for strong protection of audiovisual performers 
moral rights that would afford limited exceptions to producers taking 
action without audiovisual performers prior approval.93 
Article 4 addresses the manner with which national treatment 
would be granted to audiovisual performers.  Under the proposed 
treaty, contracting nations are required to afford equivalent 
protection and entitlements to nationals of other countries to those 
they grant to their own citizens with respect to the exclusive rights 
outlined in the treaty.94  But the treaty does allow each nation to limit 
the degree of uniform national protection with respect to each of the 
exclusive and economic rights set forth in the treaty.95  The language 
dealing with rights and exclusive rights in Article 4 is intended to 
encompass moral rights protection as well.  A similar interpretation 
was used in finding that moral rights protection is included under the 
umbrella of national treatment in Article 4 of the WPPT.96 
The U.S. and the E.U. disagreed on the appropriate scope of this 
Article.  The U.S. wanted an expanded definition of national 
treatment that would subsume all audiovisual-related rights.97  On the 
other hand, the E.U. lobbied for a narrow definition of this Article.98  
European Union representatives felt that only rights explicitly 
outlined in the proposed treaty should be given national treatment.  
Nonetheless, the two sides managed to work out their differences by 
mutually endorsing the above-referenced language as part of Article 
4 of the treaty. 
The economic rights granted to performers under the proposed 
treaty would augment compensation schemes for audiovisual 
performers currently in place in various domestic laws.  Article 6 
grants performers limited economic rights in their unfixed 
performances.   This  right  simply  allows  performers  to possess the  
 
 93 See id. 
 94 See id. 
 95 See id. 
 96 See Proposal, supra note 15; see also WPPT, supra note 7, Art. 4. 
 97 See Proposal, supra note 15, Art. 2, at 22. 
 98 See id. 
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exclusive right to control communications to the public, and the right 
to regulate the fixation of their live performances.99 
Audiovisual performers are given the right to control direct and 
indirect reproductions of their audiovisual fixations via the proposed 
treaty.100  According to the notes to Article 7, language concerning 
direct and indirect reproductions is used to highlight the fact that 
the location of the reproduction of an original fixation will have no 
significance on the performers right to control reproduction of the 
audiovisual fixation.101  This provision is an exact replica of Article 7 
of the WPPT.102 
Surprisingly, Article 7 fails to carve out a fair use exception to the 
audiovisual performers exclusive distribution right.  Article 9(2) of 
Berne does provide some language for the granting of exceptions to 
the reproduction right.103  But Berne leaves the crafting of an 
appropriate standard up to each contracting nation.  Under U.S. law, 
the fair use doctrine has been used to defend against claims of 
copyright infringement, as long as the one asserting fair use complies 
with the four factors set out in 17 U.S.C. § 107.104  European 
countries such as the United Kingdom and France adopted fair 
dealing provisions into the E.C. Rental and Lending Directive.105  
Similar to the U.S. exception, an E.C. fair dealing defense to what 
would be an infringing reproduction applies to all copyrightable 
works.106  Whether the contracting parties would include such an 
exception in implementing the audiovisual performers treaty remains 
to be seen. 
Article 8 of the proposed instrument grants audiovisual performers 
the exclusive authority to control the distribution of performances 
 
 99 See id. at 38. 
 100 Id. at 40. 
 101 Id. at 41. 
 102 See Proposal, supra note 15, at 40; see also WPPT, supra note 7, Art. 7. 
 103 See Berne, supra note 77, Art. 9(2). 
 104 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1995). 
 105 See Council Directive 92/100 on Rental and Lending Right and on Certain Rights 
Related to Copyrights in the Field of Intellectual Property, 1992 O.J. (L 346/61), cited in 
ARNOLD, supra note 26, § 5.04, at 122. 
 106 See id. 
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that incorporate their audiovisual fixations.107  This provision would 
only apply to the first sale of original copies of the fixed audiovisual 
performance.  After the first sale, each country would be allowed to 
devise additional rules governing audiovisual performers rights to 
equitable remuneration for subsequent transfers.108 
Article 9 concerns the audiovisual performers exclusive right to 
authorize the rental and lending of original copies of their 
fixations.109  Although quite prevalent in the E.U., and adopted into 
the WPPT, a performers right to control the rental and lending of his 
or her fixations has not made its way into U.S. law.110  
Understanding this dynamic, treaty negotiators designed an 
exception to this exclusive right that would allow each contracting 
nation the authority to waive compliance with this provision if it is 
deemed that, commercial rental has [not] led to widespread copying 
of fixed performances that materially impairs the right of 
reproduction.111  This exception was more than likely put forward 
by U.S. negotiators.  Such an assumption is valid due to the fact that 
U.S. movie studios receive large amounts of annual income from the 
rental of audiovisual productions.  Furthermore, a similar exception 
was drafted into Article 11 of TRIPS.112  It is uncertain whether E.U. 
nations would be required to grant national treatment with respect to 
Article 9 as it applies to U.S. audiovisual works due to this conflict 
in protection.113 
Similar to Article 6s recognition of the role digital 
communications play in the distribution of copyrightable material, 
Article 10 grants performers the exclusive right to make their fixed 
performances available by any means, including wire or wireless 
channels.114  This Article expands the scope of protection available 
to an audiovisual performer under Articles 8 and 11, as it deals with 
making a work available through interactive or on-demand 
 
 107 See Proposal, supra note 15, at 42. 
 108 See id. 
 109 Id. at 44. 
 110 See WPPT, supra note 7, Art. 9. 
 111 Proposal, supra note 15, at 44. 
 112 See id.; see also TRIPS, supra note 5, art. 14. 
 113 See LEAFFER, supra note 30, § 12.12, at 541. 
 114 See Proposal, supra note 15, at 46. 
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technology.115  Furthermore, viewers or customers who receive an 
audiovisual production via this mode of distribution are not allowed 
to make the work further available to the public or distribute it 
without the consent of the performer.116  This proposed Article is just 
a baseline standard, as contracting parties are free to enact more 
stringent legislation under their domestic law. 
Under Article 11, contracting parties agreed to provide audiovisual 
performers with the exclusive right to authorize and control any 
broadcasting and communications to the public that incorporate their 
audiovisual productions.117  The treaty defines communication to the 
public to include fixed and unfixed performances transmitted by any 
medium.118  This definition is important for two reasons.  First, the 
treaty grants audiovisual performers rights over the dissemination of 
their performances whether or not they are first fixed.  Additionally, 
by providing language that covers transmissions via any medium, the 
treaty allows performers to regulate on-line communications of their 
audiovisual performances.  The only exception to the above right 
would be for re-broadcasting.  A similar exception is carved out in 
Article 6 of the WPPT.119 
The language concerning the treatys treatment of the audiovisual 
performers authority over broadcasts to the public was much tamer 
than what was initially proposed.  Broadcasters lobbied for a 
watered-down provisional text.120  Broadcasters were able to 
secure an exception that allows each contracting nation to inform 
WIPO that a right of equitable compensation would be provided to 
audiovisual performers in lieu of an exclusive right.121  Under 
paragraph 2 of Article 11, contracting nations have the ability to 
establish a right of remuneration system that would include the 
establishment of an agency designed to clear the aforementioned use 
of the audiovisual content, and collect revenue generated from this 
 
 115 See id. 
 116 See id. 
 117 See id. at 48. 
 118 See id. at 25. 
 119 See WPPT, supra note 7, at 27. 
 120 WIPO Members Fail to Agree on Performers Rights for Audiovisual Treaty, supra 
note 91, at 233. 
 121 See Proposal, supra note 15, at 49. 
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activity.122  Such an exception greatly diminishes the administrative 
burdens placed on broadcasters, and manages to secure the 
audiovisual performers claim to compensation for the transmittal of 
their performances. 
This model for compliance with Article 11 mirrors the scheme 
now in place in the U.S. with regard to phonograms, musical works 
and the performance rights attached to these copyrightable creations.  
Musical works are performed extensively over the radio, and in clubs 
and restaurants.  Because of this fact, individual copyright holders 
would have a difficult time enforcing their performance right.  
Performance rights societies such as the American Society of 
Composers, Authors and Publishers (hereinafter ASCAP), and 
Broadcast Music, Inc. (hereinafter BMI) provide a means by which 
musical composers and publishers license and enforce their valuable 
performance right.123  ASCAP and BMI also collect income earned 
from such licenses, and distribute royalties to the musical 
composers.124 
An audiovisual rights society could similarly be established to 
administer the broadcast and communication rights of audiovisual 
performers.  Many nations possess an audio-performances rights 
society that carries out duties similar to either ASCAP or BMI.125  In 
the U.S., SAG represents audiovisual performers collectively.  One 
of SAGs duties is securing the economic rights of audiovisual 
performers in an audiovisual production.126  SAG, or another entity 
like it, would have little difficulty carrying out the collection of 
royalties stemming from an audiovisual performers broadcast and 
communication rights. 
 
 122 See id. 
 123 See LEAFFER, supra note 30, § 8.22, at 348; see also ASCAP, About ASCAP, at 
http://www.ascap.com/lp_about_ascap.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2002); BMI, BMI 
Backgrounder, at http://www.bmi.com/about/backgrounder.asp (last visited Jan. 30, 2002). 
 124 See id. 
 125 Bennett M. Lincoff, Worldwide Music Performance Rights: The Devil in the Details, 
at http://musicomm.net/rcrclincoffdevil.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2002). 
 126 See SAG ( Screen Actors Guild), Membership Services Frequently Asked Questions, 
at http://www.sag.org/faq/membership_services_faq.html#1 (last visited Feb. 6, 2002). 
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Before engaging in a discussion of Article 12s treatment of 
transfer of rights, it is worth mentioning provisions in Articles 14, 15 
and 16 concerning the term of protection, and each contracting 
nations technological measurements and rights management 
information obligations.  Article 14 sets out a fifty-year term of 
protection measured from the year fixation is first made.127  This 
standard is in compliance with both WPPT and TRIPS.128 
Article 15 deals with obligations concerning technological 
measures to which each contracting nation must adhere.129  Under 
this Article, each contracting nation is obligated to establish baseline 
legal protection and effective legal remedies against unauthorized 
circumvention of technological measures.  The notes corresponding 
to Article 15 define this standard as national level provisions that 
provide genuine support for the rights provided for in the proposed 
Instrument.130  While the Article does not outline what remedies are 
necessary to meet compliance, it does characterize those remedies 
that possess strong deterrent features, and sufficient sanctions against 
forbidden acts as being in full compliance with the treaty.131  One 
could assume from the enactment of this provision that negotiators 
understood the importance of each nation establishing effective laws 
and preventative measures, and the positive effect global compliance 
would have on consumers and businesses that desire to engage in 
electronic commerce. 
Article 16s Obligations concerning Rights Management 
Information requires each nation to provide legal remedies to any 
audiovisual performer who discovers a person knowingly engaging 
in any of the prohibited acts listed in paragraph 1(i).132  Prohibited 
acts include the removal of any electronic rights management 
information without the consent of the audiovisual performer; 
distributing and broadcasting or communicating to the public, 
without the consent of the audiovisual performer, any audiovisual 
 
 127 See Proposal, supra note 15, at 60. 
 128 See WPPT, supra note 7; see also TRIPS, supra note 5, at 305. 
 129 See Proposal, supra note 15, at 62. 
 130 Id. 
 131 See id. 
 132 See id. at 64. 
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performance with knowledge that the rights management information 
has been deleted or tampered with.133  Establishing electronic rights 
management information is completely voluntary.  Only when such 
information has been attached to the audiovisual work would a 
contracting nation be required to comply with enforcement of this 
right. 
IV.  TRANSFER OF RIGHTS: NORTH ATLANTIC TUG-OF-WAR 
All of the above proposed Articles gained consensus at the 
December 2000 Geneva Conference.134  Despite all the hard work, 
the convening nations could not come to terms on how audiovisual 
performers would transfer their rights to producers who contracted 
the services of the audiovisual performer.  Transfer of rights deals 
with the means by which audiovisual performers, and other owners 
of copyrightable content incorporated in a audiovisual production, 
transfer their rights to the producer of the work.  Such a system 
allows audiovisual producers or directors to control the bundle of 
copyrightable works within their audiovisual production, thus 
allowing for an easier means of administering and licensing the 
production. 
Battle lines over transfers of rights were drawn well before the 120 
nations convened in Geneva.  Both E.U. and U.S. negotiators knew 
that their individual approaches were quite different from one 
another, and that ultimately one side would have to acquiesce for 
ratification.135  Such a concession never came to pass. 
Four alternative Article 12 proposals were put forth at the 
meetings.  The first, Alternative E, would have established a 
rebuttable presumption of the transfer of an audiovisual performers 
exclusive rights under the proposed treaty to the producer of the 
production.136  As soon as the audiovisual performer consented to the 
 
 133 See id. 
 134 See Proposal, supra note 15, at 17. 
 135 See WIPO Members Fail to Agree on Performers Rights for Audiovisual Treaty, 
supra note 91, at 234. 
 136 See id. at 54. 
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incorporation of his or her performance in the production, the 
audiovisual performer would have triggered the transfer of the 
audiovisual performance rights.  Alternative F would have provided 
a presumed entitlement to exercise the rights.137  This presumption 
would apply so long as there was not a written agreement between 
the producer and the audiovisual performer to the contrary.138  Both 
Alternatives E and F would have been mandatory upon the 
contracting nations.139 
The FIA is unilaterally opposed to Alternative E.  The Federation 
believes that if this version of Article 12 were adopted, the 
instrument would change from being one designed to protect 
performers, to a treaty granting increased protection to producers.140  
Furthermore, the FIA appropriately notes that adopting this 
Alternative would force many jurisdictions to reduce the level of 
protection currently afforded to audiovisual performers.141 
The third proposed scheme for the transfer of rights was 
Alternative G, which served to bridge the two competing legal 
systems.  This alternative would allow each country to establish its 
own standards for transfer of rights with the laws of the country that 
is most closely connected to the audiovisual production governing 
the legal arrangement between producer and performer.142  The last 
suggested model was Alternative H, which would provide each 
nation the ability to decide whether or not they would enact 
legislation governing transfer of rights.143  Furthermore, if enacted, 
each contracting party would be allowed to determine the nature and 
scope of rights transfer legislation with no intervention from 
WIPO.144 
 
 137 Id. 
 138 See id. 
 139 See Proposal, supra note 15, at 54. 
 140 See INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF ACTORS, Comments on the WIPO Basic 
Proposal: Prepared for the Diplomatic Conference, December 2000, at 4, at http://www.fia-
actors.com/new/wipo_2000_comments_eng.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2002). 
 141 See id. 
 142 See Proposal, supra note 15, at 56. 
 143 See id. 
 144 See id. 
FRMT4BERNARD 5/17/02  3:10 PM 
2002] WIPOS PROPOSED AUDIOVISUAL PROTECTIONS 1113 
 
On their face, both Alternatives G and H would seem to be ill-
advised if the convening nations truly endeavored to strike an 
international treaty aimed at harmonization and certainty.  Each of 
these two alternatives would preserve the status quo.  The notes to 
the proposed Article best sum up this predicament: Alternative G 
gives some certainty as to what national law will apply but does not 
harmonize national laws.  Alternative H would perpetuate the current 
situation.145 
Differences between E.U. and U.S. negotiators stemmed from each 
groups desire to incorporate language found in their respective legal 
systems.  The E.U. set out to protect E.U. law in this area by making 
the transfer of rights from the audiovisual performer to producer 
contingent upon the performers express consent.146  The E.U. is 
unconditionally opposed to an automatic transfer of rights regime.147  
It is quite logical for one to be persuaded by the proposals put forth 
by the E.U. member states.  E.U. countries have for years endeavored 
to harmonize the protection afforded to audiovisual performers with 
that already granted to audio performers.148  E.U. community law has 
managed to grant protection to audiovisual performers while at the 
same time allowing producers to acquire rights in the audiovisual 
production via an administratively friendly contractual consent 
system.149 
Conversely, the motion picture and television industries of the 
U.S. offer audiovisual performers unparalleled financial 
remuneration for their contributions to a work.150 Under the current 
U.S. system, performers have extensive contracts with motion 
 
 145 Id. 
 146 See WIPO Members Fail to Agree on Performers Rights for Audiovisual Treaty, 
supra note 91, at 232. 
 147 See WIPO Official Says Deal on Global Audiovisual Pact Likely Despite Differences, 
61 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 112 (2000). 
 148 See Thierry Stoll, Introductory Speech for the E.U. Delegation at the Diplomatic 
Conference on the Protection of Audiovisual Performances (Dec. 12, 2000), at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/intprop/news/diplomat.htm (last visited Jan. 
31, 2002). 
 149 See id. 
 150 Bennett M. Lincoff, Worldwide Music Performance Rights: The Devil in the Details, 
at http://musicomm.net/rcrclincoffdevil.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2002). 
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picture studios through collective bargaining agreements with 
SAG.151  Organizations such as SAG allow both producers and 
performers the opportunity to go about their jobs without the 
unnecessary grief of negotiating agreements covering each 
performers exclusive rights, and whether or not they had been 
cleared before shooting the production.  In an effort to bring such a 
model to the international level, the U.S. trade representatives fought 
for the recognition of their system, which ensures an automatic 
transfer of rights to the producer.152  United States officials argued 
that this proposed system is essential in order to allow producers to 
show their works abroad without running into a thicket of legal and 
bureaucratic hurdles.153  One U.S. official characterized the U.S. 
approach as a more laissez-faire method of doing business, while the 
E.U. system endeavors to regulate economic relationships.154 
The disagreement between the U.S. and E.U. negotiators centered 
on two words: entitlement versus agreement.  The E.U. wanted 
the following language included in Article 12: 
[A]n agreement to exercise such rights based on the 
consent of the performer to the fixation shall be governed 
by the law of the country chosen by the parties, or to the 
extent that the law applicable to the agreement between 
the performer and the producer has not been chosen, by 
the law of the country with which the agreement is most 
closely connected.155 
The aforementioned language reads as if there was a merger of 
Alternative F with Alternative G.  The U.S. was in agreement with 
the majority of the language cited above, except that U.S. negotiators 
wanted an entitlement to exercise to replace an agreement to 
exercise.  The reason for the United States opposition to the 
phrasing of the E.U. proposal was that U.S. negotiators wanted the 
 
 151 See id. 
 152 See WIPO Members Fail to Agree on Performers Rights for Audiovisual Treaty, 
supra note 91, at 232. 
 153 Id. 
 154 See id. 
 155 See id. at 231. 
FRMT4BERNARD 5/17/02  3:10 PM 
2002] WIPOS PROPOSED AUDIOVISUAL PROTECTIONS 1115 
 
treaty to reflect the current U.S. practice of creating work made for 
hire arrangements that allow for the automatic transfer of rights from 
performer to producer.156  Furthermore, U.S. negotiators believed 
that parties who agree to such arrangements should be allowed to 
decide what national law governs their relationship.157  One U.S. 
negotiator felt that entitlement was absolutely needed . . . in the text 
in order to ensure a balanced agreement which establishes 
performers rights while also establishing certainty and clarity in the 
ability of producers to show their films internationally.158 
European Union negotiators took exception to the U.S. approach.  
In their opinion, the U.S. was attempting to protect the rights of 
producers, not audiovisual performers, and trying to inject private 
law into an international treaty and in effect impose its legal 
practices on other countries.159  European Union officials felt that 
such a policy could lead to confusion for producers, legislators and 
courts who could be faced with the following hypothetical situation: 
Usually when a work is produced in Italy using Italian actors, Italian 
law would govern the relationships between the parties.  However, 
under the U.S. transfer of rights policy, an Italian judge could be 
bound to apply U.S. law to settle any dispute if the parties had 
contractually agreed to such an arrangement.160 
CONCLUSION 
The potential benefits of an audiovisual performances treaty are 
numerous.  Producers, audiovisual performers and broadcasters on 
both sides of the Atlantic would benefit from a uniform set of laws 
that would provide audiovisual performers increased financial 
rewards  and  creative  control, while affording producers, consumers  
 
 156 See id. at 232. 
 157 See WIPO Members Fail to Agree on Performers Rights for Audiovisual Treaty, 
supra note 91, at 232. 
 158 Id. 
 159 Id. 
 160 See id. 
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and others a clearer understanding of what they can and cannot do 
with audiovisual fixations.161 
Although the agreement would more than likely increase the price 
of movie tickets worldwide, it would grant rights to audiovisual 
performers in territories where such entitlements are nonexistent.  
Jorgen Blomqvist, WIPO Copyright Division Director, noted that 
[i]f you are an actor, in many countries you have no rights 
whatsoever.162  Artists such as Hong Kong cinema star Maggie 
Cheung would be given the opportunity to take action against 
individuals who pirate her work in Venezuela.163  Furthermore, an 
audiovisual performer would have the ability to control the 
accessibility of their audiovisual performances via digital means and 
the authority to bring an action against individuals who digitally 
distribute the audiovisual performers fixation without the 
performers consent.164  Ms. Cheung commented on this dilemma by 
stating: 
On a more personal level, I am very concerned about the Internet 
because when I look up Maggie Cheung on the Internet I see about 
25 sites on my work, or photos of me, even clips from my films 
which I didnt even know about and nobody even asked me if I 
would allow this to be put onto a site.165 
Audiovisual performers have lobbied in support of a treaty that 
would transform how legislators perceive their participation in the 
motion picture and television industries.166  The FIA believes that it 
is important to have the economic rights of audiovisual performers 
governed under intellectual property rights law as opposed to labor 
 
 161 See WIPO MAGAZINE, Substantial Progress on Pact for Performers Rights (Feb. 
2001), available at http://www.wipo.org/publications/general/121/2001/févriere.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 2, 2001). 
 162 See Alexander Higgins, Action Call on Actors Rights: Actors are being Ripped Off 
by Broadcasts of Their Work Overseas and on the Internet, Says the UN, Which is Moving 
to Give Them Greater Protection, TOWNSVILLE BULLETIN, Dec. 9, 2000, at 29. 
 163 See Actors Urge Anti-Piracy Protection in Internet Age (Dec. 12, 2000), at 
http://terra.com/movies/articulo/html/mov1808.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2002). 
 164 See id. 
 165 Id. 
 166 See WIPO Members Fail to Agree on Performers Rights for Audiovisual Treaty, 
supra note 91, at 232. 
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law.  Katherine Sand, General Secretary of the FIA, noted the 
difficulty performers have with their employers under a labor law 
regime.  Ms. Sand stated that U.S. performers had to strike for 
residual payments and are constantly under pressure from 
producers. . . .  [T]hey have as precarious an existence as anyone else 
in the world.167 
In an effort to strike an accord at the next conference on the 
proposed Audiovisual Performances Treaty, E.U. and U.S. legislators 
may want to reevaluate their respective positions on Article 12.  Both 
parties agree on the overall language found in the proposed Article, 
and earnestly desire to ratify the treaty.  Although some may view 
the E.U. approach as being pro-audiovisual performer, more so than 
the United States proposal, much can be said for the financial 
rewards and critical acclaim U.S. audiovisual performers have earned 
over the years.  The SAG strike of 2000 displayed the power of the 
audiovisual performers labor force.168  The cohesive strength of U.S. 
entertainment unions were put on display again during the summer of 
2001 as the Writers Guild of America pushed for increased 
attribution rights for their contributions to audiovisual productions.  
Ms. Sands assessment of the plight of audiovisual performers may 
have been technically accurate, but she failed to address the benefits 
that have and will continue to come to U.S. audiovisual performers 
due to the SAG strike, their negotiating power and their easy access 
to the public airwaves. 
Probably the best approach to resolving the dispute concerning the 
language of Article 12 would be to allow each nation the opportunity 
to choose either of the two models for rights transfer.  A similar 
resolution was made in allowing the U.S., and other nations, the 
opportunity to become part of the WPPT without requiring these 
nations to adopt domestic moral rights legislation.  Although such an 
approach would not foster true international harmonization, it would 
pave   the   way   for   the   ratification   of   a  treaty  that  guarantees  
 
 167 Id. at 233. 
 168 For details on the strike of 2000, see Chris Neumer, SAG: Strike One, at 
http://centerstage.net/stumped/articles/sag.shtml (last visited Jan. 31, 2002); Screen Actors 
Guild, at http://www.sag.org (last visited Jan. 6, 2002). 
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audiovisual performers baseline protection in regions of the world 
where they currently lack such entitlements. 
Whether or not such an accord can be reached at the next WIPO 
conference on audiovisual performers rights is uncertain.  At the 
time of this writing, E.U. and U.S. negotiators had not conceded to 
such an approach, but remained optimistic that an agreement would 
be forthcoming.  Due to rapid globalization and increased piracy of 
entertainment content, negotiators may be pressed by their respective 
audiovisual performers rights societies and guilds, into quickly 
striking a resolution.  Such a step would certainly be welcomed by 
negotiators and audiovisual performers alike. 
 
